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The history of analytic philosophy is a troubled genre. Analytic 
philosophers have only recently shown an interest in their historical 
roots, and to date no one has succeeded in providing a historical 
account of the period (roughly) 1879-1960 which is both relatively 
complete and free from excessive bias. We have fine, historically 
sensitive studies of practically every major early figure (e.g. Kenny 
on Frege1, Baldwin on Moore2, Hylton on Russell3, Coffa4 and more 
recently Friedmann5 on the positivists, and too many to mention 
on Wittgenstein, both early and late); but these do not provide, and 
don't purport to provide, systematic accounts of the historical 
interconnections and influences in question. We also have a couple 
of ostensible histories proper; but these are either too idiosyncratic 
(Dummett6, Hacker7) or too incomplete (Gross", Passmore9) to fit 
the bill. 
Avrum Stroll has written a history of analytic philosophy which 
suffers from neither defect. He discusses, usually in some detail, 
the work of Frege, Moore, Russell, Schlick, Carnap, Austin, Ryle, 
Quine, Kripke, Marcus and both Wittgensteins. He also attempts 
to unearth influences and interrelations amongst these thinkers. It 
cannot be said, moreover, that his book suffers from any particular 
bias or radical perspective. In nearly every case he attempts 
(admirably) to meet the philosopher in question on the latter's own 
terms. Despite this, however, the book cannot be judged a success. 
In the course of this review I will indicate why this is so, beginning 
with more general reasons and proceeding to discussion of Stroll's 
section on Quine, to my mind the worst of the book's nine chapters. 
The main problem with the book is that it fails to illuminate. 
Certainly some of the discussions (e.g. of Austin and the later 
Wittgenstein) are competent and interesting; but for the most part 
the reader receives little more than some biographical data and 
stock summary of the position.10 Stroll is not without talent as an 
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expositor, and much of the biographical information is very 
enjoyable to read. However, in those cases in which he does attempt 
to go beyond this quite basic exercise, he fails. I'll give two 
examples (but see further below on Quine). First, in a chapter 
entitled "Logical Positivism and the Tractatus" Stroll wonders why 
given the mystical nature of the remarks near the end of the early 
Wittgenstein's opus and the apparent incompatibility between these 
and the metaphysics of logical atomism, Wittgenstein didn't just 
start over and write a new book (63)". This is an odd question. It 
might make some sense if Stroll were to demonstrate, and not 
assume, that there is a conflict between Wittgenstein's metaphysics 
and his mysticism. Second, Stroll notes the sad fact that Austin 
died at the height of his powers, in his late forties. He goes on to 
speculate about how philosophy might have been different had 
Austin lived for another twenty or thirty years. "My own guess is 
that its consequences would have been momentous and that the 
course of mainstream philosophy would have been radically 
different"(166). This conjecture belies a failure to understand the 
limited scope of Austin's influence. 
Stroll recognizes Quine's status as the most influential living 
philosopher, and accordingly devotes an entire chapter to his work. 
The discussion centers on Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, his behaviorism, and his epistemological naturalism. 
So far so good. But already in the opening biographical remarks 
we've got problems. Stroll notes, correctly, that Quine's 500-
page autobiography amounts in general to little more than a travel 
diary. He says truly that Quine's work seems to him the most 
important thing in his life. He then draws conclusions which are 
nothing short of absurd. "Because his inward life is everything, 
his outward life is as solitary as a monk's";"... in a way Quine is 
a sol ipsist . . . a practical solipsist who isolates himself from [the 
world]"; "Der Mann ist seiner Arbeit"( 186). On the following page 
Stroll notes an even "greater mystery. Why would a solipsist write 
not one but two autobiographies?" This entire discussion is silly 
and a complete waste of time. 
Stroll distinguishes in Quine's work what he calls 'three 
successive phases', but then notes that the stages don't follow 
temporally upon one another (the first, 'logic' phase, is said to begin 
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in 1934 and end in 1970; the third, 'epistemological' stage 
"commences in 1951"!) One wonders what 'successive' and 'phase' 
mean in Stroll's idiolect. 
We come finally to the substantive criticism of Quine. I will 
focus on four of Stroll's charges. First, he claims that Quine thinks 
there are no numbers (181, 188). This is easy to refute; it is just 
false. For at least the last forty years, and in publications Stroll 
himself mentions and quotes from, Quine has been an unrepentant 
platonist about mathematical entities. Second, he notes that Quine 
adheres to scientism. "So the question for him is whether scientific 
theory requires the existence of various kinds of abstract entities. 
His naturalism tells him that it does not"(201, his emphasis). As 
should be obvious to any reader of Quine, his concern is not with 
abstractness as such; it is with criteria of identity. Sets are abstract, 
and their identity criterion is as clear as could be. 'Two' sets are 
identical iff they have the same members. Propositions, attributes, 
and other intensional rodents are abstract as well, but lack clear 
criteria of identity. Quine keeps sets and dispenses with the rest. 
Third, Stroll thinks he has a devastating objection to Quine's 
indeterminacy semantics. "Quine thinks that we can identify what 
an utterance means with an auditor's reaction to it. But this thesis 
is susceptible to a serious objection. For an auditor to respond to 
an utterance, he must already understand what it means"(205). 
Quine does not think, nor has he ever said, that we can identify 
utterance meaning with audience reaction. Stroll is confusing, 
among other things, the intuitive notion of meaning, which Quine 
thinks is more-or-less useless, with the proposed notion of stimulus-
meaning, which is not meant to replace the intuitive notion in every 
context. The final charge from Stroll I'll consider here is that he 
thinks he sees an inconsistency within Quine's treatment of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction (206-207). The criticism is familiar 
from Boghossian (so at least here Stroll is in good company). At 
times it seems as if Quine is saying that there are no analytic 
sentences; at other times he appears to claim merely that the a/s 
distinction is not clear. Stroll and Boghossian think the two claims 
are in conflict, and it isn't difficult to see why - if the predicate 'is 
analytic' is unclear, then how could we know what, if anything, is 
in its extension? 
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The fallacy is in thinking that Quine's two claims, and I admit 
that he does say or imply both, are made on the same methodological 
level. A more perspicuous way of making his point would be to 
note first that the analytic/synthetic distinction is fatally unclear (it 
is crucial to note that clarity, at least for Quine, is a matter of degree); 
we can make no sense of it save by assuming the notions of meaning, 
synonymy or necessity, and the members of this ill-begotten triad 
are not one jot clearer than is analyticity. And second, it is to be 
pointed out that, in any case, there are no analytic sentences. Quine's 
commitments to extensionalism and to pragmatism sometimes come 
into conflict; e.g., propositional attitude contexts are woefully 
unclear, but we cannot practically get on without them. If the notion 
of analyticity (or necessity or synonymy) were likewise to be shown 
indispensable, Quine would tolerate its relative unclarity. However, 
we can do quite well without analyticity; indeed as Duhem showed 
recalcitrant data can be accommodated in sundry ways, and Quine 
takes this to demonstrate that sentences don't possess significance 
individually and that any can be revised. 
Now this argument assumes that any adequate notion of 
analyticity will entail incorrigibility; if you want a notion of 
analyticity according to which we might revise an analytic statement 
(such as Boghossian's epistemic conception), you're well advised 
to drop the word 'analytic' and take up instead 'a priori'. The 
latter can do the work needed without misleading the reader. 
In summary, while Stroll makes an honest effort at a hard and 
demanding task, his book in the end just isn't competent. The 
history of analytic philosophy has yet to be written. 
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